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Fight the hypo
Chairman [Arthur N.] Abbey, Dean [Anthony W.] 
Crowell, members of the board, colleagues, alumni, 
students, friends, and a special tip of the hat to my 
dear wife Jo for making the trip:
I’m thrilled to be here this morning and my heartfelt 
thanks to Anthony Crowell for the honor of the 
appointment and making it all possible.
In casting about for a topic, I considered draw-
ing something of interest from the courses I 
conven tionally teach; for example, “paradoxes of 
19th Century interstate taxation cases under the 
Commerce Clause, with special reference to pru-
dential standing” — all in favor of that one, raise your 
hands — or “gerunds, nominalizations, and dangling 
par ti ciples: the crisis in American compositional 
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practice.” But it dawned on me that you prob ably 
listen to lectures like these from your CLE providers 
all the time.
It’s likely to be more fun, and possibly even 
more enlightening, to think out loud about some-
thing closer to all of us — I mean, what we do in 
the law school classroom. I want to reflect for a few 
minutes — I hope you won’t think it an eternity — 
on the core of the law school experience, and 
suggest that some of what we’ve been doing might 
not make sense. I know that this claim comes as a 
surprise.
Because this is a lecture, not a treatise or an arti-
cle, I have a certain luxury: I do not intend to settle 
issues but to provoke.
I mean to talk about the core of the law school 
experience. What is law school all about? Let me put 
it in three words.
The first word is “Suppose.” It’s how we often 
begin. Suppose this, suppose that, and suppose the 
other thing. You’ve been there. Me too. I can still 
remember, and with chills, my criminal law profes-
sor, just months shy now of 50 years ago, calling out 
his Suppose. He supposed a lot about Martians, newly 
landed on the planet, wholly ignorant of earth and 
human culture, but, he assured us, fully conversant 
in English.
The second and third words are “it depends.” 
That phrase is what students, if they’re quick, soon 
learn to respond to resist their Socratic interlocutor, 
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who threatens to drag them down an un wel come 
path leading to complete intellectual and emotional 
confusion.
At the heart of the “suppose” and the “it 
depends” is the hypothetical (or what I will mostly 
refer to as the “hypo”): The situation with questions 
attached that we toss into the classroom like a bomb 
with a short fuse. The burden of my remarks this 
morning is to suggest that we don’t always know, we 
aren’t always consistent about, and we rarely make it 
clear what we’ve learned when we force an answer to 
the hypos we pose.
To make these airy abstractions concrete, let’s 
inspect a class of hypos with a distinct advantage: 
they concern a problem that we all have intuitions 
about — run away trolley cars. Trolley cases have been 
so widely studied over the years that they now consti-
tute an academic sub-discipline called Trolleyology. 
I’m not kidding you. In fact, just in the past few 
months two popular books on runaway trolleys have 
been published to consid erable notice.1 Really!
I’m going to pose two trolley hypos and ask you 
by a show of hands how you respond. (This is a law 
school: you didn’t think you’d get away scot free, did 
you?) Each of the trolley hypos has a name and this 
first one is called Spur (or sometimes Switch).
1  Thomas Cathcart, The Trolley Problem or Would You Throw the Fat 
Guy off the Bridge? (New York: Workman, 2013); David Edmonds, 
Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer 
Tells Us about Right and Wrong (Princeton: Princeton  University 
Press, 2014).
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Suppose a trolley is speeding along the tracks. 
The conductor decides to slow it down but the 
brakes fail. The trolley is a runaway. You are stand-
ing nearby watching and see, to your horror, that 
five people are tied to the tracks just ahead. If no 
one does any thing the trolley will run them over 
and they will die. Luckily, you spot a switch that will 
allow you to divert the trolley to a spur or side track. 
Unfortunately, some one is tied up on that track 
also. Luckily, though, it’s only one person. What do 
you do?
Let’s see a show of hands. How many of you 
would pull the switch and send the trolley along the 
spur, leading to the death of only the one person 
rather than the five?2 Hands in the air. Don’t be 
shy. We won’t take your names. You won’t be graded.
All right, hands down. Now, how many of you 
would refuse to pull the switch, pre fer ring to let the 
trolley run its course, leading to five deaths rather 
than one?
You voted roughly four to one, consistent with 
other respondents. Experiments with different audi-
ences during recent years show that about 80% of 
those asked about Spur vote to sidetrack the trolley 
and let one die rather than five. Most of us, it seems, 
are card-carrying utilitarians. The greatest good for 
the greatest number.
2  It probably would not have changed your mind had I said  “causing 
the one man to die rather than the five.” Do you suppose it would 
change the minds of others inclined to pull the switch?
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Now a second trolley hypothetical, this one 
called Footbridge. You are on a footbridge directly 
over the trolley tracks. Looking back you see the 
runaway trolley rushing along. Looking ahead, you 
see the five people tied to the track. Desperate to 
find some way to avert this impending disaster, you 
spot a fat man standing near you on the footbridge, 
looking down from the edge. You realize that if you 
push him over he will fall onto the track, just ahead 
of the trolley. He is heavy enough that he will stop 
the train and save the five men. Of course, he will 
die in the attempt.
Hands again: all those who would push the fat 
man onto the tracks?
Hands down, and again, those who would not 
push the fat man onto the tracks, sparing him but 
letting the five men die?
This time the vote is quite different: about 45 to 
1 against. You are much more severe than the gen-
eral population. Experimenters have found that only 
about a third of test subjects will vote to push,3 
whereas, as I have said, upwards of 80% or more will 
send the trolley down the spur.
How can we account for this discrepancy? Those 
who would pull the switch in Spur usually say that by 
the time they realize what’s about to happen, it’s a 
done deal. Someone is going to die. You have it in 
your power to save more at the expense of fewer. You 
3  Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between 
Us and Them (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), p. 215.
6f ight the hypo
didn’t set these events in motion; you just chanced to 
be there at that moment close to the switch. In Foot-
bridge, by contrast, you confront an innocent man, 
unrelated to  the unfolding disaster. If he dies, it’s 
because you personally killed him. It’s obvious ly 
immoral to kill an innocent man, even if to save oth-
ers. Does that sound correct? Is that how you would 
explain the difference? If so, you are not a utilitarian 
but — I’m going to use the technical term here — a 
deontologist. That just means, for those of you have 
forgotten Philosophy 101, that you believe people 
have certain rights not to be used, no matter the 
consequences.
Or perhaps you don’t see a discrepancy between 
Spur and Footbridge. For it turns out, on closer 
inspection, that the explanation of the difference 
that I just gave really won’t wash. In both cases, 
someone is going to die; the alternatives in each are 
five or one. The one man tied to the tracks is as 
innocent as the fat man. In each case, the choice is 
yours. If that’s so, and many people believe it is, 
then we face a big problem. How can we dif fer en-
tiate our choices, given our feelings that it’s right to 
spare the one in Spur and improper to kill the fat 
man in Foot bridge?
That’s what trolleyology is all about. It’s the 
attempt, by some very smart people, to try to sort out 
our instincts about morality through a series of 
hypotheticals about runaway trolley cars. The trolley 
problem was devised in 1967 in an article about 
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abortion.4 The author was Philippa Foot, a well-
known Oxford philosopher who happened to be the 
grand daughter of President Grover Cleveland. She 
used Spur as a minor example to sort through the 
perplexities of the abortion question — mind you, 
this was years before Roe v. Wade. Trolley problems 
were made more rigorous and brought into the 
main stream philo soph i cal conversation in articles by 
MIT philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson beginning 
in 19765 and in a 1990 book on rights.6 Since then 
the com men tary has exploded, and just this past 
year, as I said, trolleyology has found its way into the 
popular conver sa tion in two books. The literature 
has spawned quite a number of variations, including 
Loop, Two Loop, Lazy Susan, Six Behind One, 
 Tractor, Obstacle Collide, Extra Push, Tumble, 
Remote Footbridge, Footbridge Switch, Trap Door, 
and many others, including some situated not on 
trolley tracks but in hospital rooms; for example, 
Transplant. For lack of time, I won’t detain you with 
any of these variations.
4  “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double 
Effect,” Oxford Review, vol. 5:5–15 (1967), reprinted in Philippa 
Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1981), pp. 19–32.
5  Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley 
Problem,”  The Monist, vol. 54:204-217 (1976) and “The Trolley 
Problem,” 94 Yale L.J. 1395-415 (1985); see also Thomson, “Turn-
ing the Trolley,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 36(4):259-274 
(2008), in which she seems to have recanted her earlier position 
in Spur.
6  Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press, 1990).
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But how do we explain the difference most of us 
feel in sparing the five in Spur and sparing the one 
in Footbridge? One mainstream philosophical expla-
nation is known as the Doctrine of Double Effect, a 
principle that traces at least as far back as St. Thomas 
Aquinas. In essence, it says that it’s morally permissi-
ble to take an action that might prove harmful if it’s 
merely a side effect of a laudable action. As long as you 
don’t intend the harmful result, even if you know it’s 
likely to happen, you are still acting morally. For 
example, you intend to save the five men, and you 
can do so by throwing the switch to divert the trolley 
down the side track. It’s regrettable that someone 
else is tied up, but your intention is not to kill him. 
You’d be delighted if he managed to untie himself 
and scramble out of the way. In Footbridge, however, 
you do intend to kill the fat man. True, you’re doing 
so to spare the five, but you are using the fat man 
directly as a means to your end, not as a side effect. 
You would not be happy if the fat man, having fallen 
on the track, managed to rally, stand up, and step off 
the tracks just in time.
Many people accept this double effect doctrine 
as the explanation. You might also. But some of you 
may see a pretty thin line between tossing the fat 
man down and supposing that the single man, tied 
tightly to the tracks, might get away. You might blush 
to argue that the differ ence between a murder 
indictment and a humanitarian award is how plaus-
ibly you can make your inten tions innocent when 
9j ethro k .  l ieber m an
you say of Spur, “well, I didn’t mean to kill that poor 
fellow; I thought there was a chance he’d escape; I 
wasn’t absolutely sure he’d be run over.”
Lately, a new explanation for the discrepancy 
has surfaced, and from a surprising quarter. This 
new account has emerged from experi mental 
 psychology and neurology, not from analytic argu-
ments of philosophers. The psychologists and 
neurologists have come up with a startling finding. 
They say that your intuition has nothing to do with 
philosophy or reason: it has to do with brain 
structure.
In briefest compass, the explanation is this: We 
have certain neural circuitry in our brains, cir-
cuitry put there for reasons of evolutionary 
pressure when humans were coming down from 
the treetops in the jungle. Joshua Greene, director 
of the Moral Cognition Lab at Harvard, and one of 
the leading pioneers of these studies, summarizes 
the point in his current book, Moral Tribes, through 
the metaphor of the camera. These days, most 
cameras have two modes of operation: manual 
mode, in which the photographer chooses what 
speed and aperture opening to use; and  automatic 
mode, in which you just point and click, leaving it 
to the internal mechanism to figure out the param-
eters instantaneously. Manual mode takes longer 
but gives the photographer much more control and 
precision. Automatic mode is reliable for many 
sorts of pictures, but not all.
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Just so, says Greene, our brains have evolved a 
manual-mode response and an automatic-mode 
response to harm-filled situations. When we con tem-
plate Spur, we go into manual mode (because we are 
not directly using personal force against anyone as a 
means to an end); this mode permits a utilitarian 
judgment to emerge. The automatic response takes 
over when we are presented with Footbridge. We 
have a “gut feeling,” a snap emotional judgment, 
that it’s wrong to directly use a person as a means to 
an end, especially if it involves using our own per-
sonal force to seriously harm or kill him. As Greene 
puts it, our brain is wired to be “emotionally but not 
cognitively blind to side effects.”7 In other words, 
alarm bells go off auto mat ically if we perceive our-
selves (or someone else) immediately caus ing 
personal and direct harm to another person as a 
means to an end. But the bells remain silent if the 
harm is a side effect of what we’re trying to do. Of 
course we understand the side effects—it’s just that 
alarm bells don’t go off auto matically. We have to 
pause and think about it. That’s why we immediately 
sup pose some thing’s wrong with pushing the fat 
man over the bridge, but then, when we stop to con-
sider it, have difficulty understanding the difference 
between killing one on the tracks to save five, and 
pushing one over to save five.
This is a fascinating explanation, and it’s not 
mere speculation. Experimental results back it up. 
7  Greene, supra note 3, p. 224.
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For one thing, people with defects in or injuries to 
particularized brain regions are much more likely 
to say they would toss the fat man off the bridge, 
suggesting that there really is an automatic-mode 
gizmo in our circuits that in some people is 
impaired. People also are more likely to approve of 
death to the fat man if the facts of Footbridge are 
varied a bit. For example, when respondents are 
told the fat man is standing on top of a trap door, 
and by pushing a button they can open the door to 
drop him straight down to the tracks, many more 
people are likely to say that they would push the 
button than that they would push the man over the 
edge them selves. So your different responses to 
Spur and Footbridge can be explained as a combi-
nation or interaction of two factors. As Greene 
sums it up:
If you harm someone using personal force, but 
as a side effect, that doesn’t seem so bad. . . . 
And if you harm someone as a means, but with-
out the use of personal force, that doesn’t seem 
so bad. . . . But if you harm someone as a 
means and you use personal force, then the 
action seems wrong to most people. . . . Thus, 
it seems that harm as a means of using per-
sonal force is a magic combination.8
I’m willing to accept these conclusions. Who am 
I to challenge scientific findings? But I’m not per-
suaded that they explain the discrepancy between 
8  Id., p. 222.
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our instincts about the different moral resolution of 
Spur and Footbridge. I think the difficulty may lie 
in the hypos. Let me treat you to one more trolley 
example, this one, I think, of my own devis ing.9 I 
call it Evil Man.
Let me set the stage. Our professor has just 
presented Footbridge to a student sitting in the 
third row. The student has concluded, as most of 
us do, that it would be wrong to kill the fat man. 
Why? asks the Professor. Explain yourself. “Well,” 
says the student hopefully, “because he’s inno-
cent.” Of what? “I mean,” the student continues, 
confidence building, “he has nothing to do with 
the trolley.”
“Suppose,” says the Pro fes sor, “that he’s Hermann 
Göring.”
Silence from the student. This is a modern-day 
classroom.
The Professor eventually says: “You don’t know 
the name Hermann Göring?” The student blushes, 
remains silent.
“Hermann Göring was Hitler’s second in com-
mand, chief of the Luftwaffe, a plunderer of European 
art and treasure, ruthless scum. Also, he was quite 
obese.”
“Oh,” says the student, now enlightened.
9  Thomson considers at some length in her essays who the 
potential victims might be and the difference that that might 
make. Unlike Evil Man, her examples mostly center on the vic-
tims’ relationship to the tracks and how they came to be in 
harm’s way.
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“Suppose, then,” the Professor continues, “that 
Hermann Göring, a well-known fat man, is standing 
on the bridge, in a contemplative mood, watching 
the trolley move east.”
“Does he have anything to do with this trolley?”
“No.”
“What about the five men?” our student asks, 
getting the hang of it.
“What about them?”
“Who are they?”
“They happen to be five scientists who are on 
the verge of discovering a cure for cancer. If 
they somehow wriggle out of the ropes and get 
back to their lab this very afternoon, cancer is 
defeated.”
“Oh, well in that case,” says our eager student, 
“by all means, push him over.”
“Whatever happened to ‘but it would be 
wrong?’” the Professor says triumphantly, and our 
poor student once again is struck dumb and 
doesn’t understand what just happened or how he 
got there.
Evil Man seems to contradict Greene’s hypoth-
esis. The difference between Spur and this new 
version of Footbridge is not the difference 
between means and side effects or personal force 
vs. indirect force or action. It is about the charac-
ter of the potential victims, since as our student 
concluded and as many of you may agree, it’s per-
mis sible to use personal force as a means to kill 
14
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one person to save others, as long as the one to be 
killed is really evil and the five to be saved are 
really good.10
Perhaps you are thinking I’m playing a trick. It 
can’t both be right and wrong to push the fat man 
over. I propose that there is a trick, and that the 
trick lies buried in the nature of the hypo. The trol-
ley hypothetical, like many others, is what I have 
called a FAKE hypothesis or argument.11 F - A - K - E 
stands for Facts Are Known Exactly. In this class of 
hypotheticals, you construct an argument resting 
on a foundation of facts all of which are positively 
10  Perhaps the evolutionary psychologist can easily enough explain 
the student’s reaction to that too: it would make sense, after all, 
for evolution to have selected a neural gizmo that makes it more 
likely to make a snap judgment to refrain from killing a friend 
or even a stranger than a known enemy. A very recent study, 
published three days before I delivered this lecture, reported 
on an experiment suggesting that another variable may also 
affect moral judgment in Footbridge. The study found that 
people will more likely sacrifice the fat man if they are asked 
in a foreign language, rather than their native tongue, how to 
respond to the Footbridge problem. The experimenters con-
cluded that people are more likely to offer utilitarian solutions 
to moral problems (though not by a huge percentage) when they 
are separated from the emotional overtones of their own lan-
guage. Albert Costa, Alice Foucart, Sayuri Hayakawa, Melina 
Aparici, et al., “Your Morals Depend on Language,” PloS ONE 
9(4):e9842. doi:10.1371/journal.pone009842 (April 23, 2014). 
Accessed on May 15, 2014, at http://www.plosone.org/article/ 
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0094842. This result 
appears to be consistent with Greene’s conclusion that “utili-
tarian judgments depend more on cognitive control.” Greene, 
supra note 3, p. 127.
11  A term I coined in my recent book, Liberalism Undressed (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 90.
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known. You instruct your students or your readers 
that the conditions to be considered are precisely 
and only the ones specified and that they may be 
wholly relied on as true when formulating an 
answer.
A simple yet powerful FAKE argument, one that 
has echoed down the pages of human history, 
begins with this claim: “God told me to . . .” The 
argument goes like this: When God tells you to do 
something, it is moral to do it. So if God tells you to 
kill your first-born, you not only may but should do 
so. Of course, you recognize right away that as law-
yers we could never permit such an excuse. The law 
allows no defense to a homi cide charge that would 
permit you to plead that God gave you the order. 
And for a simple reason: we know of no way to 
establish the reality of your defense. Only in Hypo-
land do we know it to be true.12
That was, I now realize, the problem with my crim-
inal law professor’s class of hypo theticals involving the 
12  I mean, of course, a defense that would permit a verdict of not 
guilty that would free the defendant. To establish a defense of 
insanity, however, the law might permit you to prove what is 
known as a “deific decree delusion.” In construing its insanity 
statute, the Colorado Supreme Court said that even a defendant 
who knows  killing is unlawful, may “be judged legally insane 
where, as here, the defendant’s cognitive ability to distinguish 
right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as 
a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act.” 
People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo. 1992). The defendant 
need not prove the truth of the claim, merely that because of 
a mental disease or defect he believed it. Thanks to Robert 
Blecker for the reference.
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ignorant English-speaking Martians. He often would 
press them into service to show that drunk drivers 
couldn’t help themselves — or something like that. But 
what was specified in the hypo cannot apply on planet 
earth. In fact, it is an even worse FAKE argument than 
the God hypothesis. We can at least imagine what’s 
assumed when a defendant asserts that God told him 
how to act. It’s possible, I suppose, that some day God 
will make his presence known to the satisfaction of 
everyone and tell us just who it is he’s talking to. But it’s 
not pos si ble to imagine that someone can speak 
English (or any language) and be wholly ig norant of 
the meanings, connotations, and implications of words 
and their cultural under pin nings. The facts of the 
Martian hypo were totally dis con nect ed from its power 
to teach us anything about how the law is or ought to 
be. But, I suspect, my pro fes sor would not have let us 
say so. Had we pointed out the fatuousness of the hypo, 
he likely would have retorted, “well, just accept it as 
fact and answer the question.” That, I think, is an 
impossible request. And had a student answered it, the 
assumptions under which the student was laboring 
would likely never have surfaced. The answer would be 
worthless and the professor would not have tested what 
the student knew or was actually thinking about.
The way around the discrepancy between Spur 
and Footbridge, then, is to understand that the 
question that follows the Suppose is ambiguous. 
 Perhaps you are being asked whether on these pre-
cise facts it’s permissible to do what you’re asked to 
17
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do. The smart listener says, well, It Depends. What if 
the fat man is Hermann Göring? What if I’m not 
strong enough to push the fat man over? What if he 
resists me? What if he isn’t really positioned to land 
at the precise point on the track? What if my timing 
is off and he falls on top of the trolley, not in front 
of it? What if he isn’t heavy enough to stop it? What 
if in our tussle I topple over with him? It’s these 
sorts of wholly rational thoughts about the real 
world that are not per mitted to be raised as objec-
tions when confronted by a FAKE hypo. We live, 
however, not in a FAKE world but in a REAL one, 
where R - E - A - L stands for “Really, Exactitude 
Ain’t Likely.”
Joshua Greene of Harvard seems to recognize 
the point, without considering whether it calls into 
question the validity of his test subjects’ answers. 
He says:
Now you may be wondering — people often do 
— whether I’m really saying that it’s right to 
push the man off the footbridge. Here’s what 
I’m saying: If you don’t feel that it’s wrong to 
push the man off the footbridge, there’s some-
thing wrong with you. I, too, feel that it’s 
wrong, and I doubt that I could actually bring 
myself to push, and I’m glad that I’m like this. 
What’s more, in the real world, not pushing 
would almost certainly be the right decision. 
But if someone with the best of intentions were 
to muster the will to push the man off the foot-
bridge, knowing for sure that it would save five  
18
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lives, and knowing for sure that there was no 
better alternative, I would approve of this 
action, although I might be suspicious of the 
person who chose to perform it.13
But there is a “for sure” only in the realm of the 
FAKE, not in the world of the REAL.
I don’t mean to exhaust you but I do mean to push 
on a little further. Perhaps all of this confusion and 
apparent contradiction arises because the hypos con-
cern morality, a notor ious ly open-ended, proof-elusive 
field of inquiry. Perhaps the problem of the FAKE hypo 
does not infect the world of pure logic. Alas, I’m 
afraid that it does, and I offer you just one story, the 
so-called Linda hypothetical, made famous by Daniel 
Kahneman, the Nobel Prize-winning cognitive psychol-
ogist, and his collaborator, Amos Tversky. Here it is.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and 
very bright. She majored in phil osophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues 
of dis crim in ation and social justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demon stra tions.14
Now I’m going to ask you to say which of the fol-
lowing two statements is more probable: 
A: Linda is a bank teller.
13  Greene, supra note 3, p. 251 (emphasis supplied). Greene says 
that his experiments have “controlled for people’s real-world 
expectations,” (p. 214), but I’m unclear whether those tests 
show that respondents might answer as they do because they 
reject the hypo’s premises.
14  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 156.
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B: Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist 
movement.
Which is more probable, A or B? Raise your 
hands if you think that it’s more probable that Linda 
is only a bank teller than that she is both a bank teller 
and active in the feminist movement. Okay, now a 
show of hands if you think it’s the other way around: 
more probable that Linda is both a bank teller and 
active in the feminist movement than that she’s 
“ just” a bank teller. It looks like we’re voting two to 
one for B.
The answer? According to the logicians, A is always 
more probable than B. It’s more likely that Linda is just 
a bank teller than that she is both a bank teller and a 
feminist activist. Can we be sure the logicians are cor-
rect? Cass Sun stein, the prolific law professor now at 
Harvard, as recently as two days ago in The New York 
Review of Books, in a review of one of the current trolley-
ology books, says we can.15 If you said B rather than A 
you’ve committed the so-called “conjunction error.” It 
is, says Sunstein, “an obvious mistake: a single outcome 
has to be more likely than one that includes both that 
out come and another.” An event A, the logicians pro-
claim, is always more probable than two events, A and 
B. But I suspect we’re in the grip of a FAKE argument, 
which works only in the mathe matical realm in which 
facts can be supplied precisely.
15  Cass Sunstein, “How Do We Know What’s Moral?” New York 
Review of Books, April 24, 2014, p. 16 (reviewing Edmonds, supra 
note 1).
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Suppose we’re picking marbles out of a hat. 
Specify that there are an equal number of well-
mixed identical black and white marbles. Let’s say 
that event A is the selection of a black marble from 
the hat. And let’s say that event B is the selection of 
a black marble, followed by the selection of a white 
marble. In that case, the logicians are correct. The 
probability of drawing a single black marble is 50%. 
The probability of drawing a single black marble 
followed by a single white marble is 25%. Any 
 gambler understands these odds.
But Linda isn’t like a bag of well-mixed mar-
bles. Linda is a human being with a back ground. 
Let’s say that Linda, given her back ground, would 
be willing to be a bank teller (to have a steady 
income, and guaranteed free evenings) only if she 
could also be active in the feminist movement (call-
ing to mind Oscar Wilde’s celebrated quip that 
“The problem with socialism is that it takes up too 
many evenings”). If Linda can’t be active in the 
move ment she doesn’t want to be a bank teller. 
She’d do something else. If you asked me which is 
more probable for me, being a professor or being a 
professor and a writer, the answer is the latter, 
because if I couldn’t be a writer while being a pro-
fessor then I wouldn’t take the job of professor.16 
16  The answer may also depend on how the question is framed. I’d 
answer B if the choice was (A) being a professor or (B) being a 
professor and a writer, but A if the choice was (A) being a writer 
or (B) being a writer and a professor.
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That explains a lot about the jobs I have had — and 
the jobs that I’ve never considered.
What I’m suggesting is that people can (and 
often do) think about verbal puzzles by im porting 
their own variations, intuiting or assuming hidden 
variables. In the listeners’ minds, the facts of 
non-mathematical puzzles are not known exactly. We 
do read into these little hypotheticals our (perhaps 
automatic but nevertheless informed) beliefs about 
human characteristics. To say that Linda would more 
likely be a bank teller than a bank teller and a femi-
nist activist will trouble many of us, who understand 
that people don’t just change their deepest convic-
tions. It’s unreasonable to expect us to refrain from 
extrap ol at ing Linda’s likely path from what little 
we’re told about Linda. She is likely to continue her 
passion for social justice. Why would Linda desert 
her passion in order to become a bank teller?17
17  Of course, we could be told more about Linda. Perhaps her parents 
fell ill and she was required to take a job that would give spare time 
to care for them. Then we’d understand why she’d be a bank teller 
and not also an activist. Or perhaps we’d view the matter differently 
if Linda had become the bank manager. She wouldn’t have time to 
be an activist. Or she might consider that being identified with a 
particular political cause would not be good for the bank, and she 
is conscientious (she takes her fiduciary duties seriously as a man-
ager); hence she forgoes her personal inclination. All of these are 
things we’d think about, and reach nearly instantaneous judgments 
about, when the puzzle is posed. That we answer the hypo with an 
instinct about human psychology does not mean we are being illog-
ical. It means that the interlocutor (the researcher who has devised 
the hypothetical) hasn’t thought it through — or hasn’t thought 
through what his test subjects are thinking. That’s why the answer 
to the professor’s Suppose ought always to be It depends.
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Still not convinced? Let’s try this one:
As a child Linda regularly went to baseball 
games with her father, who managed the 
major league team in town. She always had 
dinner from the concession stand at the ball-
park. She still loves the stadium food, which 
she always consumed with condiments. Which 
is more probable?
A:  At the ball game last night, Linda ate a hot 
dog.
B:  At the ball game last night, Linda ate a hot 
dog and also ate mustard.
See what I mean? I’d vote for B. Wouldn’t you? 
The conjunction error be damned. To insist on it as 
an absolute is to forgo the possibility that the human 
subject knows things that the experimenter hasn’t 
considered. Formal propositions are never absolutes 
in the real world. In the realm of these mathematical 
hypotheticals, events are independent. But they 
never are in the human world of motivations, inter-
ests, passions, and desire. The student or subject who 
answers the Linda question is not necessarily wrong 
in assessing those charac ter is tics to decide how she 
might actually behave.18
18  In delivering the lecture, I did not mention that as a child Linda 
always ate her stadium food with condiments. Relatively few in 
the audience raised their hands when asked whether they would 
choose B. Several people told me afterward that they would 
have chosen B had I specified Linda’s taste for condiments as 
an element of her story. Whether their reaction is typical of 
23
j ethro k .  l ieber m an
Well, you may say, impatient for me to con-
clude, all that’s very interesting — I certainly hope 
you find it interesting — but what does any of it 
have to do with law and the legal system? We law-
yers are surely more sophisticated than that. We 
don’t — other than my criminal law professor — 
deal in FAKE arguments. Alas, in fact, we do. 
Since my time is short, three brief illustrations 
must suffice.
A prototypical example is the problem of 
cross-examination of the truthful witness. This 
problem has been most thoroughly and fruitfully 
explored by Professor Monroe H. Freedman of Hof-
stra Law School, whose first published law review 
article, nearly half a century ago, on the general 
problem of the lawyer’s responsibility for maintain-
ing truth in the courtroom so infuriated then Judge 
Warren Burger that he and two other judges sought 
to have Freedman disbarred just for writing the 
article.19 Freedman sought to show, among other 
things, that if the client was likely to, or actually 
did, commit perjury the code of professional 
responsibility puts the lawyer in an impossible 
people generally is hard to say, since this group of lawyers and 
law  professors was on high alert from the nuances of the hypos 
to which they had been exposed in the immediately preceding 
minutes. Their reaction does suggest that people are sensitive to 
the nuances of the question and will not all draw the same infer-
ences from the compact hypotheticals they are given.
19  Freedman tells the story in Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers’ 
 Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1975), Preface.
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 situation. Freedman advo cated allowing the lawyer 
to co oper ate with the client in presenting false tes-
timony.20 He rested his analysis in part on the code’s 
attitude toward cross-examination. Freedman asked 
us to imagine an elderly woman with im paired eye-
sight and a nervous disposition who testifies 
truthfully that she saw your client at a certain loca-
tion near the scene of a crime that he has been 
wrongly accused of having committed. Her testi-
mony will almost surely result in your client’s 
conviction. But you are confident that you can shake 
her testimony by vigorously cross-examining her. May 
you ethically make mincemeat of her? Freedman’s 
answer (as indeed, the code of professional respon-
sibility’s answer) is that you may. His point was 
that destroying the truthful witness has the same 
effect as facilitating the lying witness. As you will 
have guessed by now, I don’t doubt the answer, I 
doubt the premise of the hypo thetical. If it’s known 
to a certainty that she is telling the truth, it can-
not be moral to tear her apart. Indeed, if we knew 
to a certainty that she was telling the truth, what 
would be the point of even putting her on the 
stand? The judge should just instruct the jury that 
the defendant was indeed at the particular corner 
at the particular time and the witness did indeed 
see him. It is only because we can not assume omni - 
science, because we do not have absolute knowledge, 
20  Freedman’s account is fine-grained and sophisticated; he did 
not suppose that just anything goes.
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that we can justify testing claims through cross- 
examination.21
A like infirmity attends some hypotheticals 
designed to probe the question of legalizing assisted 
suicide. In a 1997 Supreme Court case, Washington v. 
Glucksberg,22 the plaintiffs argued that terminally ill 
mentally compe tent adults have a right to commit 
“physician-assisted” suicide. The claim was essen-
tially that the Con sti tution recognizes a fundamental 
liberty interest in “self-sovereignty”; as long as some-
one consents to die, the state may not prohibit others 
from assisting him to achieve his end. The Court, I 
think sensibly, rejected that view. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist pointed to the absence of any long stand ing 
historical tradition of assisted suicide. But a more 
direct reason is at hand. To have ove rturned a ban 
on assisted suicide would have freed the assistant, 
without any statutory safeguards in place, to assert a 
claim that the decedent had consented to be helped 
to his own demise — a claim more easily asserted 
than disproved and that we understand can be 
trusted only in Hypo land.23
21  See Monroe H. Freedman and Abbe Smith, Understanding Law-
yer’s Ethics (Newark: Lexis-Nexis, 3rd ed., 2004), pp. 163-164, 
225-226.
22  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
23  For a curious, real-world case (not involving terminal illness), 
see John Eligon, “Assisting Suicide to Be Focus of Trial in Moti-
vational Speaker’s Death,” The New York Times, February 10, 
2011, p. A20. The victim’s killer offered as a defense that the 
victim, Jeffrey Locker, drove up to him on the street and asked 
to be killed so that his family would receive insurance money.
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Finally, a fictional example from a classic movie 
— but no less real for that, since it suggests the Amer-
ican weariness with the legal procedures we employ to 
avoid the problems of the hypos we’ve been exam in-
ing. The Talk of the Town24 is about a detached law 
professor (imagine that!), played by Ronald Colman. 
His character is an un emo tion al idealist whose only 
passion is for the intricacies of the law. He has always 
dealt with the tumult of life at one remove. He is rent-
ing a house in the country while waiting to be 
nominated to the Supreme Court. Meantime, the 
town loner, played by Cary Grant, is falsely accused of 
arson and winds up hiding out in Colman’s house. 
Through madcap twists and turns, Colman tells the 
landlady, who is convinced of Grant’s innocence, that 
he cannot involve himself in the problems of people. 
But in the end Colman kidnaps the real culprit, hauls 
him back to the court room, where he fires his gun 
into the ceiling to stay the townspeople from lynching 
Grant. Colman “quiets the mob by telling them that 
the law is their most precious possession and that they 
must always respect its processes.”25 As a result of his 
heroics, our professor is nominated and confirmed to 
the Supreme Court. In an analysis of the image of the 
lawyer in popular culture, Robert C. Post says of The 
Talk of the Town: 
24  The Talk of the Town (Columbia Pictures, 1942); directed by 
George Stevens; screenplay by Irwin Shaw and Sidney Buchman.
25  Robert C. Post, “On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflec-
tions in a Dark Glass,” 75 California L. Rev. 379, 381 (1987).
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It is a wonderful moment. The man who has 
just forcibly kidnapped the criminal is lectur-
ing the crowd on the virtue of the law. The 
par adox is not accidental, for the very thrust 
of the film is that Colman’s willingness to 
break the law qua li fies him for the Supreme 
Court. Sometimes, in other words, the lawyer 
must be lawless in order to uphold the law. 
Put that way, of course, we can begin to rec-
ognize a classic American theme.26
I think that that wonderful moment has a dif-
ferent meaning. The audience recognizes that 
Colman the lawyer did right because the audience, 
transported to Hypoland, has been assured of the 
facts. The world’s opaqueness has evaporated 
because we have been told by the omniscient writer 
who the real culprit is, and so we can cheer the 
professor’s character-altering bravado. But outside 
the theater, we know no such thing. Our neigh-
bors’ frustration with the rule-abiding lawyer and 
his fidelity to a mind-numbing pro cess is very 
often a reflection of rage and baff lement at the 
world’s uncer tain ties. But we know better and we 
need to teach better. Asking whether we may kid-
nap the culprit whom we know to be guilty is to 
ask whether we may avoid the law to fulfill the law. 
Only in movies.
Some years ago, a business law textbook gave a 
bit of practical advice to students: In trying to 
 
26  Id., p. 382.
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under stand the law, don’t quarrel with the hypo, 
just answer the question.27 I’m a bit rueful about 
that advice, since I was the one who wrote it. As you 
can tell, I’ve been re considering. So I end, as I 
began, with three words: Fight the hypo.
27  Jethro K. Lieberman and George J. Siedel, Business Law and 
the Legal Environment of Business (Ft. Worth: The Dryden Press, 
1992), p. x.
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